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Hard and soft power, 1959‑2018
Dirk Kruijt
Abstract
Cuba, a country with eleven million people, played a significant military and development role from the 1960s to the late 
1980s, and is still an influential donor country. Its reputation was built on support to revolutionary and national liberation 
movements in Latin America and in Africa. Additionally, Cuba also was a provider of medical and humanitarian assistance to 
the global South. 
Cuba’s military were involved in training and advising Latin American revolutionaries and provided assistance in several 
African colonial and postcolonial wars. During the ‘special relation’ with the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries, Cuba 
had a redoubtable military and intelligence apparatus, at the same time procuring explicit defence against a potential 
invasion by the United States (US) and supporting multiple revolutionary and resistance movements in Africa, Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the COMECON, Cuba restructured its economy, strongly supported by its Armed 
Forces as a management instrument and as a food and security provider. In the 1990s, when its strong military position was 
weakened, Cuba still preserved and even expanded its medical and literacy assistance to many countries. During the period 
of the Latin American Pink Tide governments (2000‑2015), Cuba was again a high‑profile player in Latin American and 
Caribbean politics.
Introduction: Cuba’s diplomacy and ‘revolutionary internationalism’ 
Cuba, a country of  eleven million inhabitants, was a significant power in the international 
political arena from the 1960s to the late 1980s, and it is still an influential donor country. 
Its reputation was built on support to revolutionary and national liberation movements 
in Latin America (providing training and assistance to guerrilla movements) and in Africa 
(through a strong military presence). However, it is less well-known that Cuba is also an 
innovative and significant provider of  medical assistance to the Global South, beginning 
in the early 60s and intensifying until the present. To this day, the country is a significant 
development actor in terms of  medical and literacy expertise, especially in Africa and 
Latin America.
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
68 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
In this chapter, I will trace the emergence and evolution of  Cuba’s formal and informal 
diplomatic networks which supported and influenced the political and social agendas 
of  Latin American, Caribbean and African countries.1 This will be done through an 
interpretation of  Cuba’s ‘Revolutionary Internationalism’ and its motives, the modus 
operandi of  its diverse hard and soft power institutions, and its large-scale personnel 
involvement. The chapter traces the results of  Cuba’s internationalism in the context of 
their foreign relations with the two superpowers during the Cold War, and with Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East. My guiding research question is: 
how did Cuba cope with its singular position of  enmity with the US and relatively stressful 
friendship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War without losing its own long-term 
objective, which was not only to survive but also produce radical changes in the so-called 
Third World? How did Cuba maintain its influence and prestige when the military muscle 
and generous economic assistance of  the Soviet Union ended? 
With its strategic position in the Gulf  of  Mexico, and its proximity to the US (Florida, 
90 miles), Mexico (Yucatan, 120 miles), Haiti (50 miles) and Jamaica (90 miles), Cuba is a 
key country in the Caribbean. However, it is precisely this geopolitical location that made 
Cuba, the largest island of  the Caribbean, an object of  the expansionist policies of  its 
larger neighbours, especially the US. Several 19th century American presidents tried to 
annex or buy the island and its population when it was still a Spanish colony, and during 
the last of  its three consecutive liberation wars, the US intervened and occupied the island 
in 1898. 
Formally declared independent in 1902, it remained an American protectorate until 
1 January 1959, when the Cuban Revolution triumphed. However, it remained economically 
vulnerable until the end of  the 20th century, reinforced by the centuries-long tradition of 
sugar production, lack of  energy sources, and need for a strong defence structure against 
external threats. Cuba’s economic vulnerability was intensified by an economic embargo 
imposed in 1962 by the US, which also meant economic sanctions against third party 
commercial relations. 
Senior Cuban diplomat, Carlos Alzugaray, former ambassador to the European Union, 
clarified ‘Cuban national interests’ as follows (2017):
Preserving and defending the independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and 
security of  the Cuban nation as the primary mission; establishing external economic 
relations that will promote its development without being used as a means of 
external pressure; assuming and protecting a popular, democratic, and participatory 
form of  government based on its own traditions; establishing and promoting of  a 
prosperous and fair socio-economic system in which “the full dignity of  the human 
being should be the first law of  the Republic (…)”; safeguarding and protecting 
Cuba’s cultural identity and socio-political values; and projecting Cuba’s cultural 
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and ideological values internationally at a level of  involvement proportional to its 
real possibilities as an effective member of  international society.
In the course of  this contribution, it will become clear that, as a guiding principle, Cuba 
always sought and acquired political support from the non-aligned (NO-AL) countries 
and became an eminent member state of  this organisation, accompanying its military 
endeavours with humanitarian aid as long as it had one of  the largest standing armies in 
the region. After the Cold War, it continued its humanitarian assistance and maintained a 
position of  influence far beyond its ‘country class’ of  a relatively small country. 
I will analyse two distinct phases in Cuba’s relations with the outside world. The timespan 
covers the period from 1959 to 1989 during which Cuba, with Soviet support, had created 
the second-largest military force in the Western hemisphere and participated in large-
scale expeditionary operations in Africa, as well as providing continuous support to left-
wing movements and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. During the 60s, 
its revolutionary objectives and defensive and stability priorities sometimes clashed with 
those of  the Soviet Union, but in the period thereafter, keen diplomacy and military 
expeditionary support to Africa were balanced. From the early 70s to the late 80s, Cuba 
experienced relative welfare under Soviet support. However, a new phase was initiated 
with the implosion of  the Soviet Union, when Cuba’s ‘Special Period’ began, a period 
of  internal austerity and drastic changes in its foreign policy that continued in the 21st 
century, based on soft power and peace facilitation. 
Cuba’s overtures towards the Soviet Union were initiated in February 1960, when Soviet 
Vice-Premier Mikoyan visited Cuba and negotiated a trade agreement on the importance 
of  Cuban sugar, Soviet oil and commercial loans. In May 1960, diplomatic relations with 
Moscow were re-established; they had been ruptured in 1952. Che Guevara headed the 
first significant Cuban mission to the Soviet government and, in May 1962, the Soviet Union 
became Cuba’s self-appointed military protector by soliciting Fidel Castro’s permission to 
deploy nuclear missiles on the island. Kruschev intended to kill two birds with one stone 
(Pavlov, 1994:40-42): 
… positioning nuclear weapons on the doorstep of  the United States with the noble 
justification of  the “defence of  Cuba against possible American aggression”. An 
agreement was reached about the deployment of  intermediate and tactical nuclear 
missiles and specialized Soviet forces, a total of  45,000 enlisted men and officers 
with munitions and other supplies for thirty days of  combat, while authorizing 
Field Commander Pliyev in Cuba to exercise his own flexible response … without 
asking for Moscow’s permission. 
This caused the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis. After this, Khrushchev and Kennedy cut a 
secret deal without consulting the Cubans, who heard of  the deal through the radio and 
were deeply offended (Ramonet, 2008:312). The Soviet government tried to soften Cuban 
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
70 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
feelings with multi-billion-dollar grants, abundant military assistance, and the continued 
presence of  the Soviet military on the island with a combat brigade of  2,800 men.2 
However, the mutual relations only improved during the Brezhnev years (Bain, 2007:27; 
Latrèche, 2011). 
Part I: Cuba’s hard power (1960s to 1980s)
After 1959, Cuba had to handle three main concerns: redesigning its relationship with the 
US, whose growing enmity had become obvious; reshaping an economic and political 
support structure with new allies in Europe, Asia and Africa; and remodelling its formal 
and informal diplomacy to support and promote similar revolutionary efforts elsewhere 
while maintaining its sovereignty, and economic and commercial interests, and building 
a broad international support structure. That meant simultaneously building an army; 
developing formal and informal diplomacy; establishing an economic support structure 
with new allies; and creating an internal security system and foreign intelligence service. 
Army and militia (the FAR and MINFAR) 
Fidel Castro, the political and military leader of  the insurgency, resisted a counterinsurgency 
campaign by the regular army of  dictator Batista, before taking the initiative in a successful 
offensive strategy that finally caused the collapse of  Batista’s forces (Castro, 2010a, 2010b). 
Cuba’s new armed forces were created from the structures of  the guerrilla forces, the 
Rebel Army in the Eastern mountains of  the Sierra Maestra, and the armed resistance 
groups of  students and youth in the flat lands and the cities. Along with this, rebellious 
army, navy and air force officers who had been incarcerated by the former dictator were 
reintegrated in the new army (Graña, 2008). In February 1959, Fidel Castro became prime 
minister (and president in 1976), while his brother Raúl Castro took over command of  the 
Armed Forces.
Cuba’s first armaments were donated by the Venezuelan government of  that time, or 
captured by the rebel leaders, while the first military training of  the newly appointed 
officers was sometimes given by former sergeants of  Batista’s army (Báez, 1996). The new 
military ranks still referred to the former rebel army ranks, and anyone above the rank of 
captain was comandante (major), even the commanders of  brigades (Bell, Caram, Kruijt 
& López, 2004; Kruijt, 2017). In 1961, the government structure was reorganised, and 
the Ministry of  Defence became the Ministry of  the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
(FAR and MINFAR). Raúl Castro was the minister from 1959 to 2006 when he succeeded 
his brother as (interim) presiden, before being formally elected Cuba’s president in 2008, 
retiring in 2018 while remaining first secretary of  the Communist Party.
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The FAR had a double mission in the 1960s (Dominguez, 1978:342-246). The first was to 
suppress internal insurgencies of  ‘counterrevolutionary forces’, mainly in the mountainous 
Escambray region in Central Cuba where around 180 smaller and larger rebellion groups 
were contesting the new government. The second was to protect the country against 
invasions, as in the Bay of  Pigs (Playa Girón) in 1961, when a group of  1,300+ CIA-trained 
mercenaries undertook a failed invasion. After two days of  severe fighting, the invaders 
had suffered casualties of  114 dead and 1,200 captured. Immediately before the invasion, 
the government had also created a system of  militias (currently called the Milicias de 
Tropas Territoriales, MTT), youth members with light weapons who protected Cuba’s 
infrastructure and assisted the FAR. However, before the Missile Crisis of  1962, the Soviet 
Union had already provided support to the Cuban Armed Forces in the form of  equipment. 
In 1970, after a failed sugar harvest, the Cuban leadership had to publicly recognise that 
its economy needed Soviet support. Sugar was Cuba’s only real export commodity, and 
at the time both capitalist and Soviet economists were unanimous about the wisdom 
of  continuing this mono-product culture, despite all previous efforts of  industrial 
diversification and import substitution. Numerous Soviet experts visited the island for 
economic planning, business management, engineering projects, infrastructural design, 
military and technological advancement, and even higher education. In 1972, Cuba 
became a full member of  the COMECON (an association for economic integration), 
and the contingent of  Soviet specialists increased from 1,000 in the early 1960s to 6,000 
by 1975; of  them, 50% were military specialists (Duncan, 1985:87ff., 101).
Soviet investments and development assistance contributed to a remarkable growth of 
new industrial plants, and the reconstruction of  out-of-date enterprises, mostly sugar 
plants (Pavlov, 1994:76). The Soviet Union had essentially become Cuba’s mono-supplier 
of  essential products, oil and raw materials, its principal provider of  fertilisers, trucks, cars, 
and road-construction equipment, and also paid the running costs of  transportation in 
both directions, dispatching about 300 cargo vessels on a permanent basis (Pavlov, 1994:83). 
One of  the institutions that strongly benefitted from Soviet support was FAR (Báez, 
1996; Vellinga, 1976). The Cuban military maintained warm relations with their Soviet 
counterparts and commanding officers received training in Moscow or Leningrad 
(Baez, 1996). The FAR were modernised along Soviet lines, and until the late 90s, nearly 
all Cuban generals had been trained in the Soviet Union. 
In the early 70s, a re-equipment programme was launched with the most sophisticated 
weaponry (MIG fighter-bombers, T-62 tanks and BM-21 missile launchers) and military 
technology at the time (Duncan, 1985:101). During the three decades of  ‘fraternal 
cooperation’ between the Soviet Union and Cuba, the FAR was annually provided with 
supplies, training and equipment worth about US$1 billion (Latell, 2003:10). By the 
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late 1970s, the Armed Forces had expanded hugely and at its peak by the end of  the 1970s, 
and during its Africa campaigns, the FAR had between 470,000 and 510,000 members 
(Latell, 2003:11; 2009): 
It was the largest military force in Latin America and vastly bigger than those of 
countries Cuba’s size anywhere in the world. Furthermore, man for man during 
the 1970s and 1980s, it may have been the best and most experienced fighting force 
of  any small nation, with the single exception of  Israel. 
In the early 1970s, military officers also started to perform managerial functions beyond 
the soldierly realm. There had always been cabinet ministers with a military rank, and 
from that point on, a process started in which eight to ten senior members of  the FAR 
were permanently in charge of  strategic ministerial portfolios (Duncan, 1985:108-109).
The FAR also implemented large-scale expeditionary operations in Africa LeoGrande, 
1980; Gleijeses, 2002, 2013; George, 2005; Liebenberg, Risquet & Shubin, 2016). By the 
60s, the Cuban leadership had sent military deployments to Algeria and Syria, to Congo 
Brazzaville and Congo (Zaire), and it operated in the Horn of  Africa in the 70s. However, 
its most prominent role was in Southern Africa. Cuba sent 380,000 soldiers and 70,000 
additional civilian technicians and volunteers to Angola, equipped with 1,000 tanks, 600 
armoured vehicles and 1,600 pieces of  artillery (Risquet, 2007:xlvii; 2008:102). Along with 
this, Cuba had a military presence in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, 
and sent civilian ‘internationalists’ to at least ten African countries. However, the FAR 
operated only sporadically in Latin America, especially in the 1960s (Ramonet, 2008:733), 
although it was often not the FAR members who participated, but rather special envoys 
or instructors of  the Special Forces within the Ministry of  the Interior (MININT), under 
the leadership of  Piñeiro (see the section below on Foreign Intelligence).
Diplomacy (MINREX and ICAP): The managing of Cuba’s foreign relations 
Whatever the Soviet influences and pressures on matters of  foreign policies in Latin 
America, especially with respect to the political actors of  the left, Fidel Castro was never 
an obedient subscriber to Soviet politics (Pavlov, 1994:97ff.). While the Soviets assisted 
with credit lines, commercial activities, technical and military assistance, and arms delivery, 
the Cubans acted as political advisers and provided military training to national liberation 
movements in Latin America and in Africa. In fact, over several decades, Cuba was the 
‘general hospital’ for many wounded or crippled revolutionaries and welcomed insurgents 
and political exiles onto the island.
Militarily, Cuba became engaged in African wars, while politically it heavily supported 
Latin America’s guerrilla movements in the 60s and continued to help new politicians and 
actors of  the left in Latin America and the Caribbean. Fidel Castro personally monitored 
Cuba’s foreign policy closely, and this is perhaps illustrated in an observation by the 
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then-Minister of  MINREX, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. In 1972, at the request of  Cuba’s spy 
master Manuel Piñeiro, three senior members of  Cuba’s foreign intelligence requested an 
interview about the Central Committee’s policy with respect to the US. Rodriguez told 
them bluntly (Suárez & Kruijt, 2005:47ff., 233ff.): 
Look … if  Fidel instructs me that I explain to you Cuba’s policy with respect to the 
United States, I think that I’m able to do it. But don’t worry too much. Here, [even] 
the members of  the Politburo do not know what our policy is about. We’re going 
to give you instructions and you follow what Fidel and I tell you to do. Because 
here, [the two] who handle it, are Fidel and me.
Cuba was one of  the 20 founding members of  the Organization of  American States 
(OAS) in 1948, but in 1962 its membership was suspended by a majority vote, under 
strong American pressure. The island was excluded because ‘Marxism–Leninism was 
incompatible’ with the principles and objectives of  the inter-American system (Birsen, 
2015), although the two US neighbours, Canada and Mexico, never ruptured diplomatic 
relations with Cuba. During the Reagan administration, Cuba was put on the US ‘State 
Sponsors of  Terrorism’ list in 1982, and there is no other country in the world that was the 
subject of  American sanctions for so many decades (Bernell, 2011). 
Cuba’s formal and informal diplomacy was in support of  the group of  NO-AL countries, 
of  which the island became an influential member, and in 1979 and 2006, the country 
hosted the sixth and the 14th NO-AL summits. Cuban diplomacy was also explicitly 
aimed at establishing and maintaining good relations with all member states of  the United 
Nations (UN), and it participated and participates in nearly all organisations of  the UN 
system. It took special care to nurture its relations with Latin America and with the many 
small Caribbean states, all of  them voting members of  the UN General Assembly (Ceceña, 
Barrios, Yedra & Inclán, 2011; Suárez & Amézquita, 2013). Its prestige and reputation as 
an important international and regional ally made the persistent economic embargo a 
yearly dispute in the UN meetings. 
Many of  Cuba’s political alliances with leftist movements and their leaders were based 
on personal friendships with Fidel Castro, who developed a strong affinity for Caribbean 
leaders, becoming close with Chile’s Allende, Panama’s General Torrijos, Peru’s General 
Velasco, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez after 1994. He also occasionally hand-picked Cuban 
diplomats who he thought would be appreciated by these leaders and become ‘friends of 
the president’, even before the establishment of  formal bilateral relations.
An additional instrument of  informal policy was and is the Instituto Cubano de Amistad 
con los Pueblos (ICAP, Cuban Institute of  Friendship with the Peoples), initially an 
organisation created to accommodate foreign visitors and sympathisers, but which 
gradually became an institution where semi-diplomatic relations were nurtured with 
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countries still not officially tied to Cuba. These included the overseas territories of 
American and European countries, especially in the Caribbean before independence, with 
relevant political and popular organisations in other countries, and the Caribbean islands 
with American, British, Dutch and French statehood. 
The ICAP identified other actors and movements beyond the traditional ‘revolutionary 
movements’, searching for other nationalist-leftist regimes and movements: 
We realized that by being more open-minded and using a more delicate tone, we 
penetrated sectors to which we otherwise would never have gotten access. That 
is what we called “popular diplomacy”, going beyond the sectors we traditionally 
reached, the so-called “revolutionary sectors”.3
The ICAP also created ‘visiting brigades’ when American, European, African and Asian 
delegations came to the island. Notwithstanding the official Cuban ‘scientific atheism’, 
the ICAP and the Departamento América tried to invite the representatives of  Liberation 
Theology of  to the island:
During a long period, we maintained good relations with many of  the 
progressive religious believers … A large number came to Cuba and it 
facilitated the ideological and political insight of  Cubans into that even so 
important issue. On matters of  religion many Latin Americans and some 
Europeans, like François Houtart, assisted us. I conversed and dined twice 
with Gustavo Gutiérrez, the founder of  Liberation Theology, and transmitted 
him Fidel’s invitation to come to Cuba. But he didn’t dare to make that trip.4 
The famous Dominican Frei Betto (1985) came to Havana and interviewed Fidel Castro 
about religion and revolution. In the early 1990s, ICAP co-organised solidarity flights from 
Brazil (with theologists Frei Betto and Leonardo Boff ), accompanied by entrepreneurs, 
politicians, students and artists. ICAP also assisted in masses celebrated by progressive 
priests with solidarity groups from Argentina and Colombia.5
Foreign intelligence (MININT and Central Committee)
The most publicly acknowledged Cuban organisation for relations with Latin American 
rebel movements was the Departamento América, which was formally created in 1975 
but had operated under other names since early 1959. Its chief  was the veteran comandante 
Manuel Piñeiro, a close friend and confidant of  Fidel and Che Guevara. This small but 
efficient organisation was hidden in the corridors of  the MININT, until 1961 called the 
Ministry of  Government, and initially was called section ‘M’.6 
‘M’ had several sections, and section M-OE was reserved for Special Operations 
(M-Operaciones Especiales), the paramilitary unit that trained many Latin American 
guerrillas. Section M (and its successors) always operated autonomously as they were 
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created with the consent of  Fidel Castro, who wanted a swift and agile organisation 
without bureaucracy. Originally, Piñeiro was also in charge of  State Security and Foreign 
Intelligence, as Technical first Vice-Minister of  MININT. In the early 70s, State Security, 
Intelligence and ‘National Liberation’ were split in three, and ‘National Liberation’ 
became a ‘civilian’ committee of  the Central Committee of  the Communist Party. The 
Departamento America was an elite organisation, with members hand-picked by Piñeiro. 
Algeria and Mexico were of  crucial importance for Cuba. Algeria was the pre-eminent 
country for diplomatic and other contacts with liberation movements in Africa and Asia, 
and in 1962, Piñeiro formed a “working group” for strategic cooperation. Cuba assisted 
with a mission during the Algerian-Moroccan conflict in 1963, followed in 1965 by an 
agreement on intelligence cooperation between the two countries. Also in 1965, a special 
unit was created to accommodate relations with other African liberation movements. 
Che Guevara travelled to Africa for three months in 1964-1965, establishing more direct 
contacts, and Algeria was instrumental in establishing these relations. 
Mexico was the only Latin American country that did not rupture its diplomatic contacts 
with Cuba in the 60s under strong American pressure. Thus, Mexico, and by the late 
1960s Panama under General Torrijos as well, were the bridgeheads for travel and contact 
with clandestine movements in the region. In Mexico City and Panama City, many 
revolutionary refugees found a home, and institutional contacts were established during 
the decades of  military dictatorship. From the Cuban embassy in Mexico to the legation 
in Panama, intensive contacts with the Central American guerrillas were maintained.7 
Latell, the former CIA officer at the Cuba desk in 1964 and the National Intelligence 
Officer for Latin America in the 90s, considered the Cuban intelligence as ‘one of  the five 
or six best such organizations in the world, and has been for decades’ (Latell, 2007:192). 
Part II: Cuba’s soft power (1989 to present)
Civilian assistance has always been another hallmark of  Cuba’s policy, even during 
interventions in war contexts. During the Central American civil wars, the future FPL 
representative of  the largest military organisation within the Salvadorian guerrilla army 
FMLN, Jorge Juárez, was severely wounded. He remembers the treatment he received 
during his periods of  convalescence: 
It is surprising, but nobody wrote a study about the enormous efforts of 
the Cubans to attend to the many injured of  the wars in Central America. 
Nearly all patients received literacy courses, primary or secondary education 
as well; the blind were trained in braille. It was probably the most important 
contribution of  Cuba to the combatants of  Central America.8 
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In fact, most military missions in Africa were accompanied by medical and literacy 
campaigns, albeit on a smaller scale. The most striking example was the spontaneous 
post-war development assistance in Angola. When the Cuban military contingents were 
to return after their tour of  duty in Angola, the authorities asked Raúl Castro for urgent 
reparation and reconstruction assistance. Many common soldiers and officers, mechanics, 
drivers, engineers and paramedics took off  their uniforms and continued working for 
weeks, or sometimes months, as civilian volunteers, applying their own professional 
experience. However, soft power diplomacy became the first priority after the implosion 
of  the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc in the late 80s and early 90s. 
The FAR and national defence after 1991
When the Cold War came to an end and the US emerged as the only military superpower, 
the consequences for Cuba were disastrous. Cuba had become highly dependent on 
economic and military support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the form of 
credits, soft loans and export subsidies. Its economic structure had been transformed into 
a mono-exporter of  sugar and agricultural products to the COMECON countries, and 
while not a member of  the Warsaw Pact, its military standing had benefitted enormously 
from special training and favourable delivery of  equipment and spare parts. However, 
the collapse of  the Socialist bloc was not the only catastrophe that struck Cuba, as the 
US intensified their already-damaging embargo. The Cuban government announced a 
‘Special Period in Peacetime’, as the standard of  living was drastically reduced. 
Cuba’s economy and society were transfigured into a system of  extreme austerity and belt-
tightening. Food was incredibly scarce, and nutritional deficiencies began to develop, while 
the desperate shortage of  fuel nearly caused a standstill of  the public transport system. 
The government prevented hunger and starvation by distributing packages of  essential 
food and clothing, and the situation slowly improved after the turn of  the century. Cuba’s 
economy was in part refinanced by the ‘special relationship’ between Cuba and Venezuela 
after the election of  Chávez as president (Clem & Maingot, 2012; Trikunas, 2012; Piccone 
& Tricunas, 2014). The dependency on incoming hard currency (euros from tourism 
and medical tourism) grew, and dollar remittances from the Cuban diaspora increased 
from US$1,2 billion in 2006 to US$3,5 billion in 2014 (Erisman, 2018:51-55. Nickel exports, 
medical missions abroad, medical services for paying foreign visitors, and Canadian, 
European and Latin American tourism became the primary source of  foreign currency. 
President Putin pardoned 90% of  the unsettled foreign debt, and Cuba restructured its 
foreign debt with the member states of  the European Union. Finally, in 2015, after decades 
of  silent diplomacy, diplomatic relations with the US were re-established (LeoGrande & 
Kornbluh, 2014; Ramírez & Morales, 2014), but the effects of  25 years of  the ‘special 
period’ are ongoing. 
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Cuba’s military was also hit hard by the downfall of  the Socialist bloc, and in December 
1982, Soviet Party leader Andropov explicitly told Raúl Castro that the Soviet Union would 
not defend Cuba by sending troops. Subsequently, the MINFAR created a defensive tunnel 
structure and a voluminous militia system with the ‘nationwide capabilities to revert to 
guerrilla warfare in the event of  major military hostilities’ (Latell, 2003:11). Economic 
and military support by the Soviets continued on a diminishing scale after 1985, but fell 
dramatically by the end of  1991, when the Soviet Union morphed into Russia. Delivery 
of  new weapons and spare parts was very difficult, and the FAR’s only option to remain 
operational was cannibalising older equipment. Fuel was another crucial shortage. 
When Chávez negotiated with Cuban diplomats about an invitation to travel to Cuba 
in 1994, the Departamento America let him know, ‘that Cuba not even could buy him 
a matchbox’, and Chavez decided to buy the ticket himself.9 When a Guatemalan army 
delegation visited the island in 1996 during the reconciliation sessions with the guerrillas, 
the pilots were shown MIGs, but they were not ignited, as this was only permitted in 
emergency situations.10 
Trainings in Russia were cancelled, intelligence hardware was restricted, and military 
service was reduced from three to two years. The FAR’s personnel was officially halved, 
although the reductions probably went further, to one third or less of  its previous strength, 
while the budget was cut in half  (Klepak, 2000:3ff., 2005:47ff., 2014; 2018:26ff.; Diamint & 
Tedesco, 2018). A similar process occurred within the MININT’s military structures, and 
in 1994, the Special Forces of  the MININT, the training specialists of  the Latin American 
guerrillas in former decades, were dissolved. 
Thus, Cuba’s hard power diplomacy came to an end. During the 80s, Cuba had supported 
Central American guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the victorious post-
guerrilla Sandinista government in Nicaragua. However, in 1990 it had to retire all of  its 
military presence, and in 1991 the last troops departed from Africa. The reduced FAR 
received new tasks. There had always been military veteran generals in key posts of  the 
government, and now, with an economy in crisis, these veterans were selected to fulfil 
management functions in most of  the strategic Cuban industries (Klepak, 2018:30-31). 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, approximately 60% of  state enterprises had a military 
manager, and in the early 90s, promotion to lieutenant-colonel required a management 
course in agricultural or industrial economy. During the twelve years of  government by 
Raúl Castro (2006-2018), the budget of  the FAR slowly increased.
Public health care and medical brigades 
Cuba’s internationalism, which until the mid-1980s had been predominantly expressed 
through support for guerrilla movements in Latin America and the Caribbean and large-
scale military operations in Africa, had now turned to provision for humanitarian assistance 
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by medical and literacy teams (Feinsilver, 1993; Kirk & Erisman, 2009; Kirk, 2015, 2018; 
Erisman & Kirk, 2018). Cuba’s civilian development aid aims to provide poor citizens in 
underdeveloped or poor countries with assistance in fields in which Cuba has expertise: 
public health provisions and literacy campaigns, post-disaster reconstruction, and sport 
(training and facilities). According to the statistics of  the MINREX, from 1959 to 2011, 
around 156,000 Cuban civilians worked as ‘internationalists’ worldwide: 81,000 in Africa, 
47,000 in the Americas, and 10,000 in the Middle East. In the same period, around 40,000 
academic professionals, of  whom 30,000 came from Africa, graduated in Cuba.11 Cuba 
assisted in the establishment of  medical schools in Yemen (1976), Guyana (1984), Ethiopia 
(1984), Guinea Bissau (1986), Uganda (1988), Ghana (1991), Luanda (1992), Gambia (2000), 
Equatorial Guinea (2000), Haiti (2001) and Eritrea (2003).12 
The first Cuban medical mission abroad was in Algeria (1963), and by 1978, around 2,000 
Cuban health personnel worked abroad, which increased to 3,000 in 1999, 3,800 in 2001, 
15,000 in 2003, 25,000 in 2005 and 30,000 in 2007 (Kirk & Erisman, 2009:8, 12). During the 
administration of  Raúl Castro, this number grew and other medical initiatives, such as 
medical schooling for foreigners, were continued or expanded. In July 2016, 55,000 medical 
professionals (of  which 25,000 were doctors) were working in 67 countries (Kirk, 2018:59). 
This brought and brings Cuba an enormous amount of  prestige in the Global South 
(Huish, 2014:188ff.).
In October 1998, Fidel Castro launched the idea of  a special Medical School for Latin 
American students, the Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencias Médicas (ELAM). The 
university opened its doors in September 1999 with students from 18 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. By the mid-2000s, it started to attract students from other continents 
and from 2012, students from 98 countries graduated from ELAM. The ELAM system 
and study allowances also expanded to other countries when Venezuelan President 
Chávez co-financed and co-developed the Cuban initiative. ELAM-like medical schools 
were established in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, and undergraduate schools were 
set up in Guyana and Nicaragua.13 
In 2004, Cuba launched the programme Operación Milagro (Operation Miracle) to cure 
cataract and other eye diseases, co-financed by Venezuela. It started in Venezuela and 
was extended to many other countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. 
According to official data, 2,577,000 persons benefitted from this Cuban-Venezuelan 
initiative between 2004 and 2015 (Misión Milagro, 2016) Medical brigades operated and 
still operate in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, especially after natural 
disasters (Kirk, 2018:63-66ff.). In 2016, the countries which most benefitted from Cuban 
medical support in Latin America were Venezuela (28,351 medical personnel), Brazil 
(10,994), Bolivia (721), Ecuador (567), Guatemala (415) and Guyana (181); while those 
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in Africa were South Africa (9,344), Angola (1,712), Mozambique (303), Guinea (221), 
Namibia (125) and Gambia (113). During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 258 medical 
specialists were sent to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea (Anderson, 2014).
Literacy campaigns
A second instrument of  international assistance is literacy campaigns. In Cuba, a massive 
literacy campaign was organised in 1960, and in 1961 the island had been officially declared 
‘free of  illiteracy’. Based on these experiences, Cuban teachers advised on, assisted in and 
implemented literacy programmes in Angola and Nicaragua, and in other assistance 
missions in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. 
In 2000, the instrument was standardised in an audio-visual programme called ‘Yo, sí 
puedo’ (Yes, I can) (Artaraz, 2012). In the early 2000s, it was implemented in Venezuela on 
a massive scale, with half  a million unemployed students incorporated as teachers, and 
around 500 Cuban experts assisting in the specific design. In 2006, Venezuela was also 
declared ‘free of  illiteracy’, and the programme was then adapted for the multinational and 
multilingual country of  Bolivia. Of  the indigenous population, around 40,000 Quechua 
and Aymara monolingual Bolivians benefitted from the programme, while Cuban and 
Venezuelan teachers adapted the design for a second campaign during assistance to Haiti 
in the aftermath of  the 2010 earthquake.14 Meanwhile, Cuba had implemented adapted 
versions of  ‘Yes, I can’ in 30 countries (Abendroth, 2009).
Peace negotiations
By the late 80s, Cuba became engaged in peace negotiations in the Latin American region. 
Fidel Castro and Piñeiro convinced the leaders of  the M-19 and members of  the Colombian 
Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB) to engage in a political rather than a 
military solution, and Piñeiro organised meetings between the CGSB and the Salvadorian 
FMLN to facilitate formal and informal peace dialogues. Cuba continued to play a leading 
role in the peace process in Colombia and in Guatemala, the last two countries in which 
guerrilla movements were still fighting in the last decade of  the 20th century. 
After the brutal years of  counterinsurgency (1978-1983) under the military governments 
of  Lucas García and Ríos Montt, the guerrillas lost the war, and retired to remote 
indigenous regions, retaining some smaller urban pockets in the western highlands and 
the northern jungle (Balconi & Kruijt, 2004; Kruijt, 2008:144-153). The leadership of  the 
URNG lived in exile in Mexico City, from where the chief  commanders directed the war 
by fax and telephone. 
After the return to democracy, informal conversations were initiated in Costa Rica and 
Spain, and formal discussions in Oslo. From 1991 to 1996, the peace negotiations continued, 
but the real breakthrough came when two key negotiators, Rodrigo Asturias (of  the 
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Guatemalan URNG) and General Julio Balconi (an army general), reached an agreement 
about informal consultation, extended to extra-official sessions between the army and 
the guerrillas, with the silent approval of  the civilian presidents. Norway and Cuba acted 
as facilitators, and in March 1996, Cuba organised a three-day session of  reconciliation 
between the army and the guerrillas in Havana, after which the guerrillas announced 
a unilateral cease-fire, and a timetable for disarmament was drawn up.15 The peace 
negotiations were successfully ended after the Havana session, and Cuba’s relationship 
with Norway on matters of  peace in Latin America would continue throughout the larger 
period of  the Colombian peace talks in the 1990s and 2000s.
Colombia’s peace process had a history of  pacts, ceasefires, amnesties, demobilisation 
and reintegration into society (Pizarro, 2017; Villamizar, 2017). During one of  the most 
important peace processes, which lasted from 1989 to 1991, Cuba acted as a peace 
facilitator, at the request of  both the Colombian government and the guerrilla movements. 
Thereafter, only the two oldest guerrilla movements, the FARC and the ELN, continued 
their insurgency operations. From then until the present, nearly all consecutive Colombian 
presidents asked for Cuba’s assistance to re-initiate informal dialogues, re-open informal 
peace talks, provide facilities in Cuba, and ask for peace diplomacy and missions of  Cuban 
diplomats (Castro, 2017). 
After the peace agreement with FARC in 2016, peace negotiations were initiated in and 
then suspended by the new government of  President Duque. 
Conclusions
Ninety miles away from the US, the most powerful military world power, Cuba’s diplomacy 
was based on defence alliances and support from Asian, African and Latin American 
countries. With its relatively weak economic structure and its history of  sugar exportation, 
it relied largely on monocultural sugar production and generous credits and grants during 
its alliance with the Soviet Union and the European Socialist bloc. This was also true of 
its military capability. It supported guerrilla and national liberation movements in Latin 
America, largely through training, medical support and facilities on the island, and in 
Africa, with expeditionary military forces as well as medical and civilian support.
After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, Cuba’s soft power became the defining characteristic 
of  its defence policy. During more than 15 years of  intimate relations with Venezuela 
(1999-2015), Cuban-Venezuelan soft policy favoured manifold countries. It was during the 
time of  ALBA (the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, Bolivarian 
Alliance for the People of  Our America) that a special bond between Cuba and Venezuela 
was created in 2004, and afterwards expanded to Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007) and 
Ecuador (2009), and a further six Caribbean island-states between 2008 and 2014. 
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The first 15 years of  the 21st century were also Latin America’s Pink Tide, with friendly 
socialist or reformist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and 
good relations with most Caribbean island-states. Cuba and Venezuela opted for new 
Latin American bodies, where the US was absent or not dominant: UNASUR (the Union of 
South American Nations, the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, although Cuba did not 
become a member); CELAC (the Community of  Latin American and Caribbean States, 
Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, a kind of  OAS but excluding 
Canada and the US); and the Sao Paulo Forum, a side group of  leftist Latin American 
political and social movements. 
Cuban defence policy has always been interwoven with its internationalism, which 
became part of  the daily life of  many Cuban families, where husband or wife, daughter 
or son participated in missions abroad. ‘Roughly a tenth of  Cuba’s population of  eleven 
million has taken part in some form of  internationalism: as soldiers in foreign wars, disaster 
relief  personnel, teachers, doctors, cultural workers, and specialists in a vast variety of 
fields’ (Randall, 2017:209).
During the long consecutive government periods of  Fidel Castro (1959-2006) and Raúl 
Castro (2006-2018), ‘internationalism’ and international solidarity were the backbone of 
Cuba’s foreign relations and defence diplomacy. Bilateral relations with Asian, African, 
Latin American and European countries, and membership of  nearly all organisations of 
the UN system, were and are nurtured. While Cuba’s military capabilities have shrunk 
dramatically and its economy, even after the prudent reforms of  former president 
Raúl Castro, is still seeking its stability and self-sustained growth, it enjoys significant 
international goodwill. For example, year after year, the UNGA has voted against the 
continuance of  the US embargo, with a growing majority of  countries condemning it. By 
November 2017, only two countries opposed the resolution – Israel and the US. Cuba’s 
defence policy is therefore not based on military presence or sophisticated equipment, 
but on humanitarian assistance and medical expertise. It even downgraded its pretences 
of  being an offensive force promoting revolutions worldwide. In June 2019, the Cuban 
government closed the offices of  the OSPAAAL, the former Organization of  Solidarity 
with the People of  Asia, Africa and Latin America, founded in Havana in January 1966 
after the Tricontinental Conference, when it had acclaimed to be the forerunner of 
revolutionary support to the socialist cause.
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Notes
1 This article draws on research published as Kruijt (2017) and Suárez and Kruijt (2015). 
2 The combat brigade remained in Cuba until September 1991, a month after the coup attempt 
against Gorbachev.
3 Interview with Giraldo Mazola (Havana, 3 February 2012) and Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012). 
Mazola was the founding Director and Morejón was the Vice-Director of  the ICAP (see Suárez & 
Kruijt, 2005:15ff., 422ff.).
4 Interview with Fernando Martínez Heredia, Cuba’s leading philosopher until his death in 2017 
(Havana, 2 March 2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:703ff.).
5 Interview with Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:422ff.).
6 I use the term ‘Departamento América’ to cover all institutions that evolved from G2 in M in Vice 
Ministerio Técnico (VMT) of  the MININT: Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), Dirección 
General de Liberación Nacional (DGLN), all operating within the MININT, and then Departamento 
América after 1975. Eventually, the Departamento América was incorporated into the Departamento 
de Relaciones Internacionales of  the Central Committee. 
7 Interviews with Ramiro Abreu (19 and 25 October 2011), Jorge Luis Joa (27 October 2011), and 
Fernando Ravelo Renedo (interview 17 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:520ff., 95ff., 120ff.).
8 Interview with Jorge Juárez Ávila (16 July 2015).
9 Interview with Carlos Antelo, then the minister councillor at the embassy in Caracas (Havana, 
24 and 27 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:600ff.).
10 Conversations with General Julio Balconi in Cuba (October 2003).
11 Presentation by and discussion with Noemí Benítez y de Mendoza (Sociedad Cultural José Martí), 
“Internacionalismo y política exterior de la Revolución Cubana”, at the International Symposium La 
Revolución Cubana. Génesis y Desarrollo Histórico, organised by the Instituto de Historia de Cuba 
(13-15 October 2015.)
12 https://bit.ly/2w5KgFQ [Accessed 12 January 2016].
13 Interview with Maritza González Bravo, academic vice-rector of  the ELAM system (9 November 
2012); see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:656ff.). 
14 Interview with Javier Labrada (Havana, 8 November 2012). Labrada was a senior adviser in Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Haiti; see Suárez and Kruijt (2015:634ff.).
15 Interview with Ramiro Abreu, the long-time Cuban overseer during the Central American civil wars 
(Havana, 25 October 2011); see Suárez and Kruijt (2005:520ff.).
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
83Cuba’s Defence Diplomacy
References
Abendroth, M. 2009. Rebel Literacy: Cuba’s National 
Literacy Campaign and Critical Global Citizenship. 
Sacramento: Litwin Books, LCC.
Alzugaray, C. 2017. Cuban Revolutionary Diplomacy, 
1959‑2017. Cubadebate 28 September. https://bit.
ly/2QbmoY3 [Accessed 25 May 2018].
Anderson, J.L. 2014. ‘Cuba’s Ebola Diplomacy’, 
The New Yorker, 14 November. https://bit.
ly/33bBSAG [Accessed 6 June 2018].
Artaraz, K. 2012. ‘Cuba’s Internationalism Revisited: 
Exporting Literacy, ALBA, and a New 
Paradigm for South–South Collaboration’, in 
P. Kumaraswami (ed.), Rethinking the Cuban 
Revolution Nationally and Regionally: Politics, 
Culture and Identity. London: Wiley–Blackwell 
(The Bulletin of Latin American Research Series), 
pp. 22‑37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470‑
9856.2011.00645.x
Báez, L. 1996. Secretos de generales. Havana: 
Editorial SI‑MAR S.A.
Bain, M.J. 2007. Soviet–Cuban Relations 1985 to 1991. 
Changing Perceptions in Moscow and Havana. 
Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Balconi, J. & Kruijt, D. 2004. Hacia la reconciliación. 
Guatemala, 1960‑1996. Guatemala: Piedra Santa.
Bernell, D. 2011. Constructing US Foreign Policy. The 
Curious Case of Cuba. New York: Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203829264
Birsen, F. 2015. The Cuban Revolution, the U.S. 
Imposed Economic Blockade and US‑Cuba 
Relations, Global Research, 27 February. https://
bit.ly/2W5TZq6 [Accessed 13 July 2018].
Castro Ruz, F. 2010a. La victoria estratégica. Havana: 
Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado. 
Castro Ruz, F. 2010b. La contraofensiva estratégica. 
De la Sierra Madre a Santiago de Cuba. Havana: 
Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado.
Ceceña, A.E., Barrios, D., Yedra, R. & Inclán, D. 2011. 
El Gran Caribe. Umbral de geopolítica mundial. 
Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales. 
Clem, R.S. & Maingot, A.P. 2012. Venezuela’s 
Petro‑Diplomacy. Hugo Chávez’s Foreign Policy. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Diamint, R. & Tedesco, L. 2018. ‘Incertidumbres 
cubanas: Las Fuerzas Revolucionarias en el 
proceso de transformaciones’, paper presented 
at the XXXVI International Congress of the Latin 
American Studies Association LASA), Barcelona, 
23‑26 May.
Dominguez, J. 1978. Cuba: Order and Revolution. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press.
Duncan, W.R. 1985. The Soviet Union and Cuba. 
Interests and Influences. New York: Praeger.
Erisman, H.M. 2018. Cuba’s International Economic 
Relations: A Macroperspective on Performance 
and Challenges, in H.M. Erisman & J.M. Kirk, 
(eds.), Cuban Foreign Policy: Transformation 
under Raúl Castro. Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, pp. 43‑57.
Erisman, H.M. & Kirk, J.M. (eds.). 2018. Cuban 
Foreign Policy: Transformation under Raúl Castro. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Feinsilver, J.M. 1993. Healing the Masses: Cuban 
Health Politics at Home and Abroad. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
George, E. 2005. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 
1965‑1991. From Che Guevara to Cuito 
Cuanavale. London: Frank Cass.
Gleijeses, P. 2002. Conflicting Missions. Havana, 
Washington, and Africa (1959‑1976). Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press.
Gleijeses, P. 2013. Visions of Freedom. Havana, 
Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for 
Southern Africa, 1976‑1991. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press. https://doi.
org/10.5149/9781469609690_Gleijeses
Graña Eiriz, M. 2008. Clandestinos en prisión. Havana: 
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
Huish, R. 2014. The Heart of the Matter. The Impact 
of Cuba’s Medical Internationalism in the Global 
South, in C. Krull (ed.), Cuba in a Global Context. 
International Relations, Internationalism, and 
Transnationalism. Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, pp. 176‑207. https://doi.org/10.5744/
florida/9780813049106.003.0011
Kirk, J.M. 2015. Healthcare without Borders: 
Understanding Cuban Medical 
Internationalism. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida. https://doi.org/10.5744/
florida/9780813061054.001.0001
Kirk, J.M. 2018. The Evolution of Cuban Medical 
Internationalism, in H.M. Erisman & J.M. Kirk 
(eds.), Cuban Foreign Policy: Transformation 
under Raúl Castro. Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, pp. 59‑75.
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
84 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Kirk, J.D. & Eirsman, H.M. 2009. Cuban Medical 
Internationalism. Origins, Evolution and Goals. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Klepak, H. 2000. Cuba’s Foreign and Defence Policies 
in the ‘Special Period’. Ottawa: FOCAL Paper 00‑4. 
February.
Klepak, H. 2005. Cuba’s Military 1990‑2005. 
Revolutionary Soldiers during Counter 
– Revolutionary Times. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Klepak, H. 2014. A Model Servant. The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces and Cuban Foreign Policy, 
in C. Krull (ed.), Cuba in a Global Context. 
International Relations, Internationalism, and 
Transnationalism. Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, pp. 44‑57. https://doi.org/10.5744/
florida/9780813049106.003.0003
Klepak, H. 2018. The Defense Contribution to Foreign 
Policy: Crucial in the Past, Crucial Today, in 
H.M. Erisman & J.M. Kirk (eds.), Cuban Foreign 
Policy: Transformation under Raúl Castro. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 25‑41.
Kruijt, D. 2008. Guerrillas: War and Peace in Central 
America. London: Zed Books.
Kruijt, D. 2017. Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America. 
An Oral History. London: Zed Books.
Latell, B. 2003. The Cuban Military and Transition 
Dynamics. Miami: Institute for Cuban and 
Cuban‑American Studies.
Latell, B. 2007. After Fidel. Raul Castro and the 
Future of Cuba’s Revolution. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Latell, B. 2009. The Revolutionary Armed Forces: 
Cuba’s Institutional Linchpin. Miami: Institute for 
Cuban and Cuban American Studies. 
Latrèche, L. 2011. Cuba et L’USSR. 30 ans d’une 
relation improbable. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
LeoGrande, W.M. 1980. Cuba’s Policy in Africa, 
1959‑1980. Berkeley: University of California, 
Institute of International Studies.
LeoGrande, W.M. & Kornbluh, P. 2014. Back 
Channel to Cuba. The Hidden History of 
Negotiations between Washington and 
Havana. North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press. https://doi.org/10.5149/
northcarolina/9781469617633.001.0001
Liebenberg, I., Risquet, J. & Shubin, V. 2016. 
A Far‑Away War: Angola 1975‑1989. 
Stellenbosch: African Sun Media. https://doi.
org/10.18820/9781920689735
Misión Milagro: 12 años al servicio de los más 
necesitados’. 2016. TeleSUR, 7 July. https://bit.
ly/38OJvhy [Accessed 29 November 2017].
Pavlov, Y. 1994. Soviet‑Cuban Alliance: 1959‑1991. 
New Brunswick: University of Miami, 
North‑South Center, Transaction Publishers.
Piccone, T. & Tricunas, H. 2014. The Cuba‑Venezuela 
Alliance. The Beginning of the End? Policy 
Brief, June 2014, of the Latin America Initiative 
– Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS. https://brook.
gs/2wPclkT [Accessed 22 June 2018].
Pizarro, E. 2017. Cambiar el futuro. Historia de los 
procesos de paz en Colombia (1981‑2016). 
Bogota: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial.
Ramírez Cañedo, E. & Morales Domínguez, E. 2014.  
De la confrontación a los intentos de 
“normalización”. La política de los Estados Unidos 
hacia Cuba. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales (2nd edition).
Ramonet, I. 2008. In Conversation with Fidel. Havana: 
Cuban Council of State Publications.
Randall, M. 2017. Exporting Revolution: Cuba’s Global 
Solidarity. Durham: Duke University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822372967
Risquet Valdés, J. 2007. ‘Prólogo a la edición cubana’, 
in Piero Gleijeses. Misiones en conflicto. La 
Habana, Washington y África, 1959‑1976. 
Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales (3rd 
Cuban edition), pp. vii‑xlviii.
Risquet Valdés, J. 2008. ‘La epopeya de Cuba 
en África negra’, in P. Gleijeses, J. Risquet 
& F. Remírez (eds.), Cuba y África. Historia 
común de lucha y sangre. Havana: Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales.
Suárez Salazar, L. & Amézquita, G. 2013. El Gran 
Caribe en el siglo XXI. Crisis y respuesta. Buenos 
Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias 
Sociales (CLACSO).
Suárez Salazar, L. & Kruijt, D. 2015. La Revolución 
Cubana en Nuestra América: El internacionalismo 
anónimo. Havana: RUTH Casa Editorial (e‑book).
Trinkunas, H.A. 2012. The Logic of Venezuelan Policy 
during the Chávez Period, in R.S. Clem. & 
A.P. Maingot (eds.), Venezuela’s Petro‑Diplomacy. 
Hugo Chávez’s Foreign Policy. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, pp. 17‑31. https://doi.
org/10.5744/florida/9780813035307.003.0002
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
85Cuba’s Defence Diplomacy
Vellinga, M. 1976. The Military and the Dynamics 
of the Cuban Revolutionary Process. 
Comparative Politics, 8(2):245‑270. https://doi.
org/10.2307/421328
Villamizar, D. 2017. Las guerrillas en Colombia. Una 
historia desde los orígenes hasta los confines. 
Bogota: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, 
serie Debate.
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/04 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
